The 											ruthless expulsion of a fifteen year old Gypsy girl to Kosovo, a girl who lived 											with her family for five years in France, drew added attention to the migration 											policies of that country. The girl was picked up during a school trip by the 											police and taken directly to the airport. The uncompromising internal politics 											of the interior minister Valls has led to severe tensions within the Socialist party. 											Many exponents of the party have accused President Hollande to continue a 											policy similar to that of his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy and to tolerate 											Manual Valls as a “sarkozy like prefect”. Meanwhile in Paris, a demonstration 											with a few thousand participants demonstrated against the deportation of 											Leonarda Dibrani and French immigration policies (Lehnartz 2013). In an 											interview with Euro News (2013) Dibrani suggests that Kosovo is not her home 											now. Her whole life, her future, is in France. She does not understand the 											migration policy of the socialist government. In spite of the controversial policies, 											Manuel Valls remains the most popular minister  of the Socialist party according to surveys. The right-wing 											National Front has seen a massive increase of voters in recent months.
Despic – 											Popovic (2013) trace the historical context of the relationship of Kosovo and 											its Rroma, a theme of greater public interest in the background of the 											expulsion of Leonarda Dibrani. She notes that before the Kosovo War in 1999, 											about 100,000 Rroma lived there[1], 											today there are still around 30,000. Unemployment and exclusion are daily occurrences. 											Rroma are regularly accused of having collaborated with the Serbian regime, 											because several Rroma buried the victims of the Serbian army as gravediggers. 											With the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state in 2010, many exiled 											Kosovars, including many Rroma have been forced to return to Kosovo. The 											deportees, among them many children, often do not speak either the two official 											languages of Kosovo (Serbian or Albanian), rendering inclusion in the school 											system more difficult. In addition, access to the labour market and to health 											care is far from assured for minorities. The UN High Commission for Refugees 											and Amnesty International, have called for a permanent international protection 											for Rroma.
Atlantico 											(2013) takes a critical look at the social integration of Rroma in Kosovo. Since 											independence in 2008, Kosovo has been criticised by human rights organizations 											for its violation of the rights of minorities. Discrimination, its resulting 											poverty, and internal displacement are widespread. Wanda Troszczynska of Human 											Rights Watch states: “Les pays 											européens renvoient les gens les plus vulnérables du Kosovo vers une situation 											de discrimination, d’exclusion, de pauvreté et de déplacement à l’intérieur de 											leur propre pays d’origine.” [European 											countries send most vulnerable people back to Kosovo towards a situation of 											discrimination, exclusion, poverty and travel within their own country.]
Le 											Carboulec (2013) adds that the deportation of Leonarda Dibrani and her family 											to the highlights whole question of dealing with asylum seekers in France. Is 											it appropriate to “surgically” to identify and remove people without papers? 											The Rroma are therefore once again the focal point of French politics with 											regard to the treatment of minorities, undocumented migrants and foreigners in 											general.
Akerman 											(2013) and thirty other people take the French society made a statement in 											writing in Mediapart about Manuel Valls’ statements about Rroma. The signatories 											state their great concern about the denigration of Rroma by the French Minister 											of the Interior and demand a more respectful handling of the members of this 											ethnic minority. She herself, as a lesbian, and also gay, bisexual, transsexual 											or transgender have always had to justify their identity of course wrongly so, in 											the course of their biography. The Socialist Party should not degenerate into a 											mere appendage of the UMP but must rely on its socialist values: “Les problèmes roms ont des noms 											parfaitement connus et nullement originaux : ils s’appellent droit au travail, 											droit au logement, précarité, stigmatisation, honte et pauvreté. Ce n’est pas 											nous qui sommes idéalistes, c’est ce gouvernement, son ministre de l’Intérieur, 											son Premier ministre, et celui qui les a nommés, qui sont racistes.” [Roma problems are well known and not original: they are called right 											to work, right to housing, insecurity, stigma, shame and poverty. It is not we 											who are idealistic, it is the government, the Minister of the Interior, the 											Prime Minister, and he who appointed them, who are racist.]
Francis 											Chouat (2013), the mayor of Evry takes a position in Le Monde on Valls 											controversial statements. As mayor, his perspective requires him to take pragmatic 											solutions about the concerns of his citizens. In the case of Rroma, this means 											that one must looks straight at the truth. Chouat believes that most of the 											Rroma living in the illegal settlements live in conditions of exploitation or as 											part of mafia networks. They therefore have virtually no power to act own or 											are involved in criminal activities: “La 											vérité, c’est d’abord la réalité regarder en face. Ce sont les conditions de 											vie dans les campestratus ment, totalement indignes, les enfants en danger, 											souvent exploites – comme beaucoup de femmes – par of réseaux mafieux. Ce sont 											aussi les vols et les Trafics organisés. […] La vérité, c’est donc dire que 											le claire ment of démantèlement campestratus ment est un impératif. Un pour les 											impératif Riverains comme pour la roms dignité of populations.”[The truth is, 											first look at reality. These are the living conditions in the camps, totally 											unworthy, children at risk, often exploited – like many women – by criminal 											networks. There is also the trafficking and organized theft. […] The truth is 											it clear that dismantling these settlements is a must. An imperative for local 											residents as to the dignity of the Roma population.] Chouat aligns himself 											to a governmental police way of looking at Rroma, to the eviction of camps which 											he thus legitimises. The possibility that the Rroma living in camps might 											simply settle there because of poverty and lack of alternatives is negated. 											Instead questionable ideas about intra-ethnic clan structures and relations of 											exploitation are dished to legitimise intervention.
Mouillard 											(2013) addresses the question of where the EU’s 50 billions earmarked for the 											Rroma integration went. On one hand, the EU support is divided into three pots: 											the European Social Fund, the European Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. 											From these three funds in turn only a fraction will benefit Rroma. The actual 											expenditure for the integration of Rroma is difficult to track because the 											French Household Statistics do not work with ethnic categories. The integration 											projects named by Mouillard thereafter refer to travellers, people living in 											ghettoes or marginalised ones as in the case of housing projects. Another 											problem lies in the fact that EU countries only use a fraction of their 											assigned money from three funds effectively: “Mêmes faiblesses en Hongrie, où 40% 											des fonds sont dépensés, ou encore en Bulgarie (20%). Une précision tout de 											même : cet argent n’est pas perdu. Il retourne dans les caisses de Bruxelles, 											au titre de la règle du «dégagement d’office.»” [Same 											weaknesses in Hungary, where 40% of the funds are spent, or in Bulgaria (20%). 											Accuracy though: the money is not lost. It is returned to the coffers of 											Brussels, under the rule of “decommitment.”] Another problem lies 											in the administrative and organizational hurdles, making the access to the 											funds more difficult.